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Abstract 
 
This essay addresses the needs of so called ‘climate migrants’. It focuses exclusively on the 
relocation of the population of Kiribati, a small island nation in the Pacific Ocean whose very 
existence is threatened by the effects of climate change. With the principles of causality, 
morality, capacity and community, Miller’s Connection Theory provides the study with a 
framework for discussing the distribution of responsibility. The communitarian principle plays 
a key role in the essay’s attempt to identify a particular agent with remedial responsibility. 
Further, the essay aims to be specific and straight forward, and therefore avoids vague 
expressions such as “wealthy nations” or “richer countries” when addressing the agents who 
are responsible. As a result, three specific nations are assigned remedial responsibility. 
Furthermore, the aim of the study is not only to investigate how responsibility for climate 
migrants from Kiribati could be distributed, but also to provide insight on the usefulness of 
Miller’s theory. Along the lines of previous research, the essay suggests that the capacity 
principle should work as a threshold when responsible agents are considered. It further proposes 
a way of using the Connection Theory by restructuring it to suit particular cases, where several 
principles could work together as a threshold. 
 
Key-words: Kiribati; Small Island Developing States; climate change; migration; relocation; 
responsibility; the connection theory  
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1 Introduction 
 
In 2010 a team of journalists released a book consisting of photographs and stories from various 
places in the world – the United States, Bangladesh, Chad, Maldives, Germany, China, Tuvalu 
and the Himalayas. What inhabitants of these countries all have in common, is that they are 
already living with the effects of climate change. Be that an increase in storms, changes in wind 
patterns, increasing or decreasing rainfall, heat waves, the melting of snow covers or the 
threatening sea-level rise. Regardless of whether these events are long term or short term, they 
have great impact on everyday life for the people exposed.1 As a result, people are forced to 
either adapt, and if that is not possible, they will have to move away from the most exposed 
areas. This latter group of people, whom I will refer to as “climate migrants”, are forced to 
migrate in order to avoid these, often life-threatening, situations. At the same time, they are 
generally not accepted as refugees in the international community.2 Since the number of climate 
migrants are only likely to continue to grow, this is an issue that needs to be addressed and 
planned for. 
 This is where my curiosity arose from. How does the international community deal with 
climate migration? How should they deal with these migrants? What measures can we expect 
different actors to take? The various effects of climate change, and the unique situation that 
each country is facing led me to the decision to focus on only one nation and their particular 
situation.  
 The choice fell on Kiribati. To give the reader a basis for the reasoning throughout the 
essay, the next section will give a brief introduction to the country and the problems they are 
facing due to climate change. 
 
 
1.1  Kiribati and the Impacts of Climate Change 
Kiribati is a small South Pacific Island nation consisting of 32 atoll3 islands, and one raised 
limestone island, out of which 21 are currently inhabited by the roughly 100 000 citizens.4 The 
                                                          
1 Collectif Argos, Climate refugees, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2010. 
2 Sweden and Finland are the exceptions, but neither provide a full cover; see Susan Martin, “Climate Change, 
Migration, and Governance”, Global Governance, vol. 16, no. 3, 2010, p. 406. 
3 Atoll islands are narrow islands with a base of coral reefs.  
4 Simon D. Donner & Sophie Webber, “Obstacles to climate change adaptation decisions: a case study of sea-
level rise and costal protection measures in Kiribati”, Sustainability Science, vol. 9, no. 3, 2014, s. 333. 
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islands are located south-west of Hawaii and north-east of Australia and New Zealand. A former 
British colony, Kiribati gained independence in 1979 and has since been a sovereign state.5 
 As a small island state, Kiribati reaches 3-4 metres above mean sea level, and the islands 
are generally only a few hundred meters wide, which make Kiribati especially vulnerable to 
changes in sea-level. 6  
 Every fourth year the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) releases a 
wide-ranging report on climate change. The latest, the Fifth Assessment Report from 2014, 
states that it is "virtually certain that sea level rise will continue beyond the 21st century"7, even 
with aggressive mitigation measures.8 The actual sea level rise is expected to have large 
regional differences, and areas in the tropical western Pacific could be facing levels up to four 
times the average.9 This will in many cases have a devastating result for small island nations, 
and adaptation is needed in order for their territories to stay inhabitable for as long as possible. 
Atoll islands stand out among the marine ecosystem when it comes to vulnerability.10 Apart 
from land loss, sea-level rise is also likely to have negative effects on freshwater supplies.11 
 It is generally known that climate change is man-made,12 but unfair as it may seem, small 
island nations' greenhouse gas emissions amount to only a tiny fraction of global emissions. 
Facing the inevitable climate change, these islands are nevertheless some of the most vulnerable 
of nations.13 Addressing the emissions from industrialized nations as “eco-terrorism”, as 
Kiribati’s president Anote Tong commonly does,14 might not be the most common description 
of the (in)action of industrialised countries. It still gives an inclination of the frustration and 
anger among people who live in a place where the rising sea-level is as visible as it is 
threatening. 
                                                          
5 “About - Kiribati”, Government of Kiribati, Official Website, <http://www.climate.gov.ki/about-kiribati/>, ac-
cessed 2015-01-11. 
6 Ibid. 
7 IPCC: 2014, “Coastal systems and low-lying areas” in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability, Part A: Global and Sectorial Aspects, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ICCP), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 2014, p. 369. 
8 Ibid, p. 394. 
9 Ibid, p. 369; IPCC: 2014, “Small islands” in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. 
Part B: Regional Aspects, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, 
NY, USA, 2014, p. 1619;  
10 ICCP: 2014, “Coastal systems and low-lying areas”, p. 364. 
11 ICCP: 2014, “Small islands”, p. 1622. 
12 ICCP: 2014, Synthesis Report, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014, 
Assessment Report 5, 2014, s. 10. 
13 ICCP: 2014,  “Small islands”, p. 1618. 
14 Jeffrey Goldberg, “Drowning Kiribati”, Bloomberg Businessweek, 21 November 2013, <http://www.busi-
nessweek.com/articles/2013-11-21/kiribati-climate-change-destroys-pacific-island-nation> (accessed 2015-01-
11) 
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 Although Kiribati, as well as climate migration in general, presents the international 
community with a unique set of circumstances - that is, being able to predict a likely-to-come 
stream of migrants years ahead - little is done to prepare for such an event.  
 Kiribati receives help from several international actors when it comes to adaptation and 
mitigation. The Kiribati Adaptation Plan is now in its third stage, and builds on previous 
adaptation measures within the nation.15 SIDS (Small Island Developing States) Action 
Platform works as a forum for island nations who are all in similar situations. Here the states 
can work and plan alongside each other, as well as coming together as a collective voice in the 
international community.16 
 However, when considering the possibility of climate migration, there are no international 
agents who are eager to assist. Considering the vulnerability of Kiribati, both as a low lying 
island nation and as a less developed country, more international involvement is unavoidable 
in order for these people to be able to migrate with dignity.17  
 The Government of Kiribati has its own plan of action with regard to climate change. It 
is divided into three steps – mitigation, adaptation and relocation. Although relocation is 
viewed as an option of last resort, the Government of Kiribati acknowledges that it may well 
be inevitable. 18 The relocation strategy consists of two key components. Firstly, there must be 
opportunities for the I-Kiribati (= the Kiribati citizens) to migrate now and in the years to come. 
Those who already have migrated are likely to play an important role in helping other 
individuals to do the same. Secondly, the migrants from Kiribati must make sure they live up 
to the qualification standards in the receiving countries.19 
 There is a special agreement with New Zealand, who grants up to 75 visas each year for 
people from Kiribati between the ages of 18-45, who meet the health and language requirements 
and who have job offers in New Zealand that meet certain income requirements.20 This is of 
                                                          
15 “Kiribati Adaptation Programme Stage III”, The Government of Kiribati Official Website, 
<http://www.climate.gov.ki/category/action/adaptation/kiribati-adaptation-program/kiribati-adaptation-program-
phase-iii/>, accessed 2015-01-11. 
16 “SIDS Action Platform”, <http://www.sids2014.org/index.php?menu=14>, accessed 2015-01-11 
17 “Relocation”, The Government of Kiribati Official Website, in “Action”, 
<http://www.climate.gov.ki/category/action/relocation/>, accessed 2014-12-04. 
18 “Action”, The Government of Kiribati Official Website, <http://www.climate.gov.ki/category/action/>, 
accessed 2014-12-04. 
19 “Relocation”, The Government of Kiribati Official Website, accessed 2014-12-04. 
20 Government Of New Zealand – Immigration, 
<http://www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/stream/live/pacificaccess/>, accessed 2015-01-11. 
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course problematic for anybody who does not live up to these standards. Neither does 75 people 
a year make much of an impact on a population size that is constantly on the increase.21 
  It is worth mentioning that Kiribati has procured a piece of land in Fiji, but this will first 
and foremost be used to secure food supply.22  
 
 
1.2  Responsibility from Miller’s Point of View 
 
The article “Distributing Responsibilities” presents David Miller’s initial view of the 
distribution of responsibility. What he finally comes up with is what he calls “The Connection 
Theory”, which has the purpose is to define which agent has which responsibility for remedying 
a certain situation. In his examples Miller considers nations, populations, companies as well as 
individuals as possible candidates for having remedial responsibility.23 This means that some 
agent will be “more” responsible than the others, depending on the particular situation. The 
basis on which he investigates responsibility rests on four principles: 
 
 1. Causal responsibility: Who caused the situation? 
2. Moral responsibility: Was the Agent who caused the situation aware of the 
consequences? Was it done on purpose?  
 3. Capacity: Who has the capacity to remedy the situation?  
4. Community: Are there any communal ties that makes one agent more responsible than 
the other? 24 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 Radio Australia, ”Urgent Measures Needed to Curb Population Growth in Kiribati: UN”, 4 July 2014, 
http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/program/pacific-beat/urgent-measures-needed-to-curb-
population-growth-in-kiribati-un/1337780 (accessed 2015-01-11) 
22 Laurence Caramel, “Besieged by the rising tides of climate change, Kiribati buys land in Fiji”, The Guardian, 
1 July 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/01/kiribati-climate-change-fiji-vanua-levu (ac-
cessed 2015-01-11) 
23 See the example of Iraqi children in David Miller, “Distributing Responsibilities”, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, vol. 9, no. 4, 2001, p. 453. 
24 Ibid, 455-464. 
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1.3  Purpose, Problem Statement and Research Questions 
In the likely event of destroyed fresh-water recourses or great losses of land, the inhabitants of 
Kiribati will be forced to move from their home. Since the islands of the nation will become 
uninhabitable, the relocation will have to be to another state’s territory, indicating that the 
relocation cannot occur without international involvement. Despite this evident need, very little 
actions is taken towards helping Kiribati in the relocation of its population. 
 Thus the purpose of this essay will be to identify who can be seen as responsible for 
remedying this situation. Considering that most recent studies are based on ‘climate migration’ 
in general, I will narrow my focus down to climate migration from Kiribati exclusively. This I 
hope will result in more specific results. I want to identify a particular agent with a particular 
responsibility.  
 In order for this study to be successful I will have to examine several possible aspects of 
responsibility. My choice of theory has therefore fallen quite naturally on David Miller’s 
Connection Theory, which takes causality, morality, capacity and community into account. 
Because of Miller’s somewhat controversial idea that there is always someone who is 
remedially responsible, the purpose of the essay is also to provide an evaluation of practicality 
and usefulness of the Connection Theory.  
 
My research question is as follows: 
 
 What agents can, according to Miller, be assigned remedial responsibility for climate 
migrants from Kiribati, and what conclusions about the connection theory can be drawn 
from the results? 
 
In order to find an answer to this question I will consider matters such as on what grounds 
agents can be responsible for climate migration from Kiribati, and what possible agents there 
are to consider. It also requires a decision why one agent is “more responsible” than the others. 
Furthermore, I am interested in how specific the results can get just by narrowing my focus 
from climate migration in general to the relocation of the I-Kiribati. I also hope to highlight 
both strengths and weaknesses of the Connection Theory.  
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1.4  Structure and Material 
 
Both climate migration from Kiribati and Miller’s Connection Theory are in focus of the study. 
The method used will be a form of case study which provides the basis of a theoretical 
evaluation. By applying the case of climate migration from Kiribati on the Connection Theory, 
I will both identify agents who can be seen as remedially responsible, but also evaluate the 
theory and its usefulness. The first function of the theory will be as a theoretical perspective 
and methodical base. When the first investigation has been carried out, the theory, along with 
the results, will be examined and put in relation to the existing research. Thus, the Connection 
Theory has three functions – theoretical perspective, methodical base, and the subject of 
investigation.  
 In the first part of my analysis where I apply the case of Kiribati's climate migrants on 
Miller's theory, I have looked for material on the basis of Miller's four principles. My choices 
of material for the analysis will be explained continuously throughout the investigation and the 
discussion that follows.  
 Previous literature on the subject of climate related migration and the distribution of 
responsibility will be further presented in chapter three, “Previous Research”, which will give 
a brief outline of common concepts, theories and ideas relevant to my study. This literature was 
helpful when defining the purpose of this essay, and also functioned as a framework for the 
discussion and theoretical evaluation.  
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2   The Connection Theory 
 
The article “Distributing responsibilities” is Miller’s first introduction of the Connection 
Theory. Millers’s ideas of responsibility distribution are further developed in the book 
“National Responsibility and Global Justice”. 25 The first mentioned article considers all types 
of agents (nations, industries, organisations, individuals etc.) while the book focuses 
exclusively on the role of nations, looking at aspects such as nationality, collective 
responsibility and responsibility for the national past.  
 Curious of the outcome when more types of agents are considered, I have focused on the 
version introduced in the article, which I believe to represent the very foundation of the theory. 
 As previously mentioned, Miller’s Connection Theory will be both a theoretical 
perspective and a methodical base. This section gives a thorough presentation of both the 
general ideas behind the theory, and a full explanation to each of the four principles on which 
the method is entirely based. 
 The problem Miller investigates in his article is the distribution of responsibilities for 
what he refers to as “bad situations”.26 Against a normative foundation Miller states that the 
existence of suffering and deprived people calls for a remedy, which in turn calls for someone 
to be responsible for ending this unwanted situation.27 To find a way of identifying who is 
remedially responsible constitutes the foundation on which his theory is built. Thus he has the 
problem statement “what connects a particular agent A to a particular patient P in such a way 
that A is singled out as having remedial responsibility towards P that others, in general, do not 
have".28 
 The task of his article is to find a comprehensive theory that can always provide an answer 
to this question. His aim is also for the theory to gain a wide acceptance in order for the claims 
to be taken seriously.29 Miller is not concerned with ‘formally assigned responsibilities’, such 
as those that are established by law. He seeks to identify the “underlying principles” that can 
serve as guidelines in cases where no formal responsibility can be assigned.30 As has been 
stated, Miller examines four principles that are commonly associated with distribution of 
                                                          
25 Miller, David, National responsibility and global justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007. 
26 Miller, 2001, p. 453.  
27 Ibid, p. 453. 
28 Ibid, p. 454.  
29 Ibid. 
30 Miller, 2001, p. 454. 
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responsibility - causal responsibility, moral responsibility, capacity and community. Miller 
concludes that these principles should not be seen as competing, but that they all fill a function 
when addressing responsibility, and thus should work together as a “pluralistic approach”. This 
results in what Miller names The Connection Theory. 31 
 He presents this as a water-proof theory that guarantees that there is "always some agent 
who can be assigned responsibility" for remedying the situation of our concern.32 This particular 
responsibility is what he refers to as remedial responsibility. 33  
 Translating Miller's problems statement to the case that will be examined in this essay, 
the question would read as follows: what connects a particular agent to the climate migrants 
from Kiribati in such a way that this agent is singled out as having remedial responsibility 
towards these migrants that others, in general, do not have?.34 This needs to be answered in 
order to fulfil the purpose of this essay. 
 Both real and fictional cases that Miller uses as examples in the development of his theory 
are often very simple, and the few real examples given are looked at superficially with no 
conclusions provided. This contributes to my interest in how the theory would perform when 
tried on a complex case such as the relocation of the I-Kiribati. 
 
 
2.1  The Principles 
 
The first principle Miller introduces is that of causal responsibility, which highlights the 
Agent's (A) causal role. This principle examines if, and to what extent, A was responsible for 
bringing the unwanted situation about. Consider a case where A is carrying a heavy stone whilst 
walking down the sidewalk. Because of the rain the stone gets slippery, and A drops it right on 
the Patient's (P) foot. This is an obvious accident, but it is still caused by A, who accordingly 
would be seen as causally responsible, even though the action was unintentional (and therefore 
not immoral).35  
                                                          
31 Ibid, pp. 468-469. 
32 Ibid, p. 471; my emphasis on always. 
33 Ibid, p. 453; Miller's definition or remedial responsibility: "To be remedially responsible for a bad situation 
means to have a special obligation to put the bad situation right (...) a responsibility towards the deprived or 
suffering party that is not shared equally among all agents.", p. 454. 
34 Ibid, p. 454. 
35 Miller, 2001, pp. 455-456. 
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 The second principle, moral responsibility, is closely linked to causal responsibility, and 
they often go hand in hand. Here is one of Miller's own examples to understand the difference 
between moral and causal responsibility. Let us say Miller takes his son Jamie and Jamie’s 
friend Nick to the park to play. Say now that while Miller is distracted by the newspaper he is 
reading, Jamie manages to break Nick’s arm. In this situation, who has what responsibility? 
Arguably Jamie is causally responsible, since he caused the injury, while Miller is considered 
morally responsible being the adult who took them to the park, which implied having 
responsibility for both of them. 36  Depending on the specific circumstances, it is of course also 
possible that Jamie is morally responsible (maybe by intentionally pushing Nick off a swing). 
 Miller uses words such as fault and blame to describe unjustifiable conduct.37 According 
to Miller's definition of moral responsibility, suitable questions to ask would be "whether the 
agent intended the outcome, whether he foresaw it, [and] whether his behaviour violated some 
standard of reasonable care".38  
 Consider again the situation where A carries a heavy stone down the street. If A 
consciously decides to throw the stone at P's foot, A is both morally and causally responsible - 
A did it on purpose, and knew of the consequences beforehand.39 A has intentionally caused 
the pain in P's foot, and is therefore both causally and morally responsible for remedying P.  
 According to Miller there are two ways for agents to be morally responsible. The first is 
if the agent acts wrongly; and the second, if an agent fails to act "as duty requires".40 In the case 
of Miller, Jamie and Nick in the park, we would assign moral responsibility to Miller because 
he failed to act as duty requires, being the adult taking to boys to the park. Suppose that Jamie 
did actually cause the injury intentionally, he would be assigned moral responsibility on the 
ground of acting wrongly.  
 A reminder of the goal to find somebody to put “the bad situation” right. Returning again 
to the situation where A drops/throws a stone at P's foot, and P is unable to walk. Let us presume 
that A for some reason is unable to help P afterwards. What, then, is the point in assigning 
remedial responsibility to A? In other words, what happens when an agent is causally or morally 
responsible, but is incapable of remedying the situation? 41 
                                                          
36 Ibid, p. 456. 
37 Ibid, p. 458. 
38 Ibid, p. 456. 
39 The level of moral responsibility might however differentiate depending on the reasons behind A's actions. If 
A was doing it to prevent something even worse, then the (supposedly) immoral action caused to P might be out-
weighed by the (here unknown) moral factor in the situation. 
40 Miller, 2001, p. 458. 
41 Miller, 2001, p. 460. 
 10 
 
 Contrary to the two previous principles, the capacity principle looks exclusively forward, 
focusing on finding a solution or remedy, rather than analysing the past in the way that the 
moral and causal principle does. It would not make a difference to P if we assigned remedial 
responsibility to A, if A was unwilling or unable to do anything about the situation – what 
matter is that someone helps. Miller argues that the agent who has the capacity to remedy a 
certain situation, should be assigned responsibility.42 Maybe B, who happened to witness the 
event, is better capable of helping P than A is.  
 The final principle Miller discusses is the communitarian principle. This principle 
suggests that responsibility could be assigned on the basis of community connections. Miller 
refers to a broad definition of community, describing it as "special ties of various kinds such as 
those that exist within families, collegial groups (...), nations and so forth".43 As an example we 
could again use the above named situation of A throwing a stone at P, and where B is a witness. 
Let's say P is out on a walk with his/her family when this occurs. In this situation Miller would 
argue that P's family rather than B are the ones who are responsible for making sure P is 
alright.44 He claims that communitarian links between people automatically, and justifiably, 
imply special responsibilities between each other – responsibilities that are stronger than those 
one generally has toward people outside of one’s community.45    
 
 
2.2  The Strongest Connection 
 
For each case, all principles should be considered. They have no specific hierarchic order, and 
are, as mentioned before, not competing with each other. If there is more than one agent who is 
responsible, and if more than one principle applies, the agent with the strongest connection 
should be assigned remedial responsibility. It is also possible that the responsibility is 
distributed between several agents, depending on what serves the particular situation best.  
Identifying the strongest connection does however rely completely on “shared moral 
intuitions”.46  
                                                          
42 Ibid, pp. 460-461. 
43 Ibid, p. 462. 
44 Causal responsibility does however create a connection between A and P, and it might still be expected of A to 
remedy the situation the best he/she could. Perhaps only by apologizing, but maybe one would go so far as to 
ask A to pay the medical bills. 
45 Miller, 2001, p. 462. 
46 Miller, 2001, pp. 468-471. 
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 Miller divides responsibility into two types: immediate responsibility and final 
responsibility, which often means that the agent who is best placed to remedy the situation has 
short-term responsibility, while an agent ascribed long-term responsibility often has a causal, 
moral or communitarian ties to the situation.47  
 Miller further hopes that his theory, and the narrower responsibility distribution it 
generates, will help to avoid inaction. He argues that failure to act stems from situations where 
responsibility is too widely dispersed - it is a result of everybody waiting for someone else to 
step in. By using his four principles, Miller believes that we will always be able to identify an 
agent to whom we can assign responsibility.48 Ultimately, the theory aims for the agent to feel 
responsible, and act accordingly. If the surrounding agents all make the same judgement, the 
outside pressure might contribute to the actions of the agent with remedial responsibility. 49 It 
is therefore important that the arguments are solid, so that there is a common agreement on who 
bares what responsibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 Ibid, p. 468. 
48 Ibid, pp. 469, 471.  
49 Ibid, p. 469. 
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3  Previous Research  
 
 
3.1  Climate Change and Migration 
 
One of the most significant discussions in the field of climate change and migration is that of 
definitions - what is the correct way to refer to so called 'climate migration', and what role does 
climate change actually play for migration? 
 Unfortunately existing research has failed to agree on one generally accepted definition 
of migration in response to climate change. As a result there is a multitude of different 
terminologies in order to refer to people escaping the effects of climate change, ranging from 
“climate migrants”50, “environmental migrants”'51 or “environmental refugees”52, to the usage 
of more unspecific terms such as “climate change related movement”53 and “environmentally 
displaced people”54.  
 Diane C. Bates made an early attempt at classification of what she referred to as 
“environmental refugees”,55 and although this term is commonly used, it has been criticised for 
causing confusion since it is both conceptually and legally incorrect.56 For this reason I use 
“climate migrant”, which is less confusing and excluding - a refugee is per definition someone 
who migrates, but a migrant is not, as stated, always a refugee. Romain Felli, on the other hand, 
pays little attention to legal arguments, but suggests that the choice of either 'refugee' or 
'migrant' represents two separate discourses. The climate refugee discourse associated with 
                                                          
50 See e.g. Robert A. McLeman, Climate and Human Migration – Past Experiences, Future Challenges, Cam-
bridge University Press, New York, 2014, p. 9. 
51 Jane McAdam (red.), Climate change and displacement: multidisciplinary perspectives, Hart Publishing Ltd,  
Oxford, 2010, reprinted in 2012 (2012:b), p. 1. 
52 See e.g. Jörgen Ödalen, “Climate Refugees: Normative Problems and Institutional Solutions” in Yoshihisa  
    Hagiwara (ed.) Democracy and Governance for Civil Society, Fukosha Publishing, Tokyo, 2010, pp. 123-142  
    and Derek R. Bell, “Environmental Refugees: What Rights? Which Duties?”, Res Publica, vol. 10, no. 2, 
    2004, pp. 135-152. 
53 See e.g. Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, Oxford University Press, 
    New York, 2012:a, p. 52. 
54 Jane McAdam, “Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is Not the 
    Answer”, International Journal of Refugee Law, vol. 23, no. 1, 2011, p. 4. 
55 Diane C. Bates, “Environmental refugees? Classifying Human Migration Caused by Environmental Change”,  
    Population and Environment, vol. 23, no.5, 2002. 
56 See e.g. Jane McAdam, “Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is Not the 
    Answer”, International Journal of Refugee Law, vol. 23, no. 1, 2011, p. 3. 
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catastrophe and confusion; and the climate migrant discourse focused around adaptation and 
management.57  
 There is, however, some common agreements in existing literature. For example, most 
work are in agreement about the complexity of climate change related migration. For instance, 
it may be long term or short term, national or international, individual or collective, and so 
forth. There is also agreement in that climate change is never the single trigger, but that other 
factors, such as socio-economic situations, always play an important role when people decide 
to migrate.58 
 With this in mind, I still believe that the migration from Kiribati that I am investigating 
can be referred to as “climate migration”, since climate change is the key push factor for the 
relocation by making the islands uninhabitable. This does not imply that no other triggers are 
involved, but only that I will not address them in this study due to their secondary role. Further, 
I respect the official opinion of the Government of Kiribati when it comes to addressing these 
migrants. The president, Anote Tong, is of the opinion that Kiribati’s citizens should never have 
to become “refugees” but that they should be able to “migrate with dignity”.59 In this context 
the use of migrants thus symbolizes a more hopeful outlook on the future.  
 
 
3.2  International Law and Responsibility 
 
The comprehensive work of Jane McAdam presented in the book “Climate Change, Forced 
Migration, and International Law” was a great help when I defined the purpose of this essay. 60 
Covering all legal aspects of climate related migration, the book explained the vulnerability of 
this particular group of migrants under International Law, and thus emphasises the urgent need 
of investigation of responsibility assignation. The book addresses Refugee Law, Humanitarian 
Law, and Environmental Law from both a national and international point of view. McAdam 
reaches the conclusion that none of these cover cases of climate migration.61 When considering 
                                                          
57 Romain Felli, “Managing Climate Insecurity by Ensuring Continuous Capital Accumulation: ‘Climate  
    Refugees’ and ‘Climate Migrants’“, New Political Economy, vol. 18, no. 3, 2013.  
58 These issues are usually addressed together. See for example Martin, 2010, p. 400; Bell, 2004, p. 136; 
    McLeman, 2014, p.2; McAdam, 2011,pp. 12-15; McAdam, 2012:a, 18-24.  
59 Goldberg, 2013. 
60 McAdam, 2012:a. 
61 Ibid, Chapter 2, 3, 4. ; McAdam does however acknowledge that article 2-3 of ECHR and article 6 & 7 of ICCPR 
provides some protection for certain groups of climate migrants, but it is not sufficient. 
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what should be done about this apparent absence in International Law, there are a few different 
suggestions from different researchers within the field. 
 Some argue that a new treaty should be introduced, or that existing treaties/laws should 
be expanded to cover migration caused by climate change.62 Alternatively, Geddes and 
Sommerville argue that inevitable disagreeing among parties will make binding law unlikely, 
and that focus should instead be on "softer measures", such as policy making.63 Similarly, 
McAdam enters the debate by expressing her concern with what she interprets to be the 
dangerous idea of a new treaty being seen as the answer to the issue of climate migration. She 
argues that a new treaty might not achieve much actual results, since they need to have political 
support in order to be fully effective. The result might very well end up being too vague due to 
the generality and universality that applies to international politics. Instead, McAdam argues, 
bilateral or regional agreements may generate more effective outcomes, as they respond to 
"particular scenarios in particular geographical areas".64 Susan Martin simply concludes that 
since we are in the very beginning of the discussion of policies on climate migration 
management, the subject needs more investigation when it comes to the solutions for potential 
migrants.65      
 Dereck Bell's article "Environmental Refugees: What Rights? Which Duties?" from 2004 
addressing the issue of responsibility.66 Bell argues that the rights of climate migrants do not 
have to rely on historical arguments of injustice, but considers two potential liberal theories of 
justice instead.67 Bell reaches the conclusion that neither of the approaches are sufficient, 
although they both make interesting points.68  
 Just like McAdam argued that a widespread agreement about a treaty might take away 
from its actual effects by being too vague (see above), an idea of finding one theory which 
includes all types of climate migrants will inevitably also present vague results.  
 Opposite to Bell, Raphael J. Nawrotzki takes a theoretical approach that argues from a 
historical point of view. He concludes that none of the arguments he considered for his article 
                                                          
62 See e.g Ödalen, 2010; and Nevena Urosevic, ”Environmental ’Refugees’: Should the UNHCR Enlarge its Man-
date to Include Environmental Migrants?" Undercurrent, 2009, Vol. 6 Issue 3, p. 27-34.  
63 Andrew Geddes & William Somerville, "Migration and environmental change in international governance: the  
    case of the European Union" Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, vol. 30, no. 6, 2012, p.  
    1026.  
64 McAdam, 2011, p. 21; quotation from p. 26. 
65 Martin, 2010, p. 409-410. 
66 Bell, 2004, p. 138. 
67 Ibid, p. 139-140, 146. 
68 Ibid, p. 151. 
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were stronger than the already existing moral and causal responsibility of the industrialized 
world towards climate migrants.69 
 Rather than investigating responsibility assignment by looking at the past, Jörgen Ödalen 
focuses on the present and future, arguing that the problem of climate migration stems from the 
fact that rich nations impose (present) risks upon poorer nations.70 In the article "Climate 
Refugees: Normative Problems and Institutional Solutions" Ödalen addresses the normative 
issue regarding which legitimate claims climate migrants can make against developed states.71 
He raises many interesting issues and to some extent even questions our very concept of 
democracy and state borders.72 Ödalen argues that if in need, climate migrants have "a right to 
be relocated", and he also addresses the issues of group relocation in contrast to individual 
relocation73. Despite raising many original ideas, Ödalen, too, ends up with a vague proposal 
of a new global protocol. In addition, he also fails to recognize the complexity of situations 
within different groups of climate migrators.74 
 Taking the debate one step further, Mathias Risse completely dismisses arguments of any 
historical kind. By reconstructing a several hundred years old theory by Hugo Grotius, he 
initiates a theoretical standpoint which he refers to as "common ownership of the earth". Risse 
argues that "any two human beings have symmetrical claims to independently existing 
resources"75 and that there is a "human right to relocation"76. The responsibility is then placed 
on all of us to share the earth, and for receiving states to assist in whatever way necessary.77    
 Megan Bradley has used Miller’s Connection Theory when attempting to examine state 
obligations and responsibilities toward climate migrants, a project presented in the article 
“’Migrants in a Feverland’: State Obligations Towards The Environmentally Displaced”. This 
article of hers is of particular interest to me, since Bradley has narrowed down the perspective 
                                                          
69 Raphael J Nawrotzki, “Climate Migration and Moral Responsibility”, Ethics, Policy & Environment, vol. 17, 
    no. 1, 2014, pp. 69-87; Nawrotzki uses moral and causal responsibility as if they were one and the same, see for 
    example p. 82. 
70 Ödalen, 2010, p. 124. 
71 Ibid. 
72 E.g. when asking whether "those who are affected by a desicion should have a possibility to influence that 
decision" he, see Ödalen, 2010, p. 125. 
73 Ibid, pp. 131, 134- 137. 
74 Noteworthy: In "Efter Floden: Klimatmigration och den rika världens skyldigheter", Ödalen presents a  
    forthcoming project in which he will analyse the richer world's responsibilities towards climate migrants.  
    Reading the presentation, it does not, however, seem like he takes much consideration to the complexity of  
    different groups of climate migrants; Ödalen, Jörgen, “Efter Floden: Klimatmigration och den rika världens  
    skyldigheter”, Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, vol. 113, no. 1, 2011. 
75 Risse, Mathias, “The Right to Relocation: Disappearing Islands Nations and Common Ownership of the Earth”,  
    Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 23, no. 03, 2009, p. 295. 
76 Ibid, p. 293. 
77 Ibid.  
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from climate migration in general, to look exclusively at small island nations in the danger zone 
of sea-level rise, and she focuses on Kiribati and Tuvalu.78  
 Bradley reaches the conclusion that remedial responsibility should be distributed between 
industrialised nations on the basis of the causal and moral principle,79 where the capacity 
principle should also be considered for what seems to be a way to narrow down the candidates 
a little further.80 However, my interpretation of Miller’s theory seems to differ from Bradley’s. 
I have understood Miller as emphasising that even though many agents are responsible, it is of 
absolute importance that we can single out one agent, or a small group of agents, as remedially 
responsible.81 I believe Bradley’s conclusions to be diffuse, as no particular agents are pointed 
out. Considering that it is already a well-known fact that the industrialized world cause climate 
change, this situation is a perfect example of when (causal) responsibilities are distributed too 
widely, causing inaction – something which the Connection Theory strives to avoid.82 In the 
article Bradley mentions the United States as a fleeting example of a nation that emits a large 
amount of greenhouse gases.83 She does not address any other actor directly, but ‘tip-toes’ 
around the question, referring to possible candidates as “those wealthy states” or “better off 
societies”.84  
 Something these existing accounts all have in common is that they never reach any actual 
conclusions about which particular agents are responsible, and seldom addresses specific cases. 
They speak of “the rich nations”, “climate migrants” or “small island states”, but never point to 
specific agents or nations, at least never to both the one responsible and the one towards this 
agent is responsible. These general approaches may be intentional with the aim of reaching 
some all-including solutions. Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that not until we have identified 
both parties can we make real evaluations of the theories that are considered. Neither can we 
expect issues to be solved and action to be taken until we have identified the problem and the 
one we hold responsible for making the situation “right”. 
 
 
 
                                                          
78 Megan Bradley, “’Migrants in a Feverland’: State Obligations Towards The Environmentally Displaced”,  
    Journal of International Political Theory, vol. 8, no. 1-2, 2012, pp. 147-158. 
79 Ibid, p. 149, 155. 
80 Ibid, p. 154 - 155. 
81 See for example Miller, 2001, p. 469, the second paragraph. 
82 Ibid, p.469. 
83 Ibid, p. 153. 
84 Ibid, see e.g. pp. 155, 156. 
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3.3 The Connection Theory 
  
Having addressed Miller’s theory when practically used, this section will focus on theoretical 
approaches to the Connection Theory.  
 Thom Brooks has written a few theoretical responses to the theory. His article 
“Cosmopolitanism and Distributing Responsibilities” is a reaction to the article in which 
Millers develops the Connection Theory.85 One of the main aspects Brooks problematizes is 
that states may not be assigned remedial responsibility, even though they are causally and 
morally responsible, something which can happen for instance when another connection is 
stronger.86 The theory, he argues, also promotes unequal relations between states, since they 
will have greater responsibilities to some than to others.87 Brooks questions the basic opinion 
of Miller that remedies must exist, which can make for unjustifiable solutions where one state 
can be assigned responsibility for a situation caused by another,88 and furthermore asks relevant 
questions such as “how much suffering is necessary to create remedial responsibility to cure it? 
(…) What should be done if [causally and morally responsible states] remain unable to 
compensate those who acted on their behalf?” etc.89  
 Brooks argues that Miller has not paid enough attention to the political implications of 
the theory, for example that it makes it possible for states to neglect their duties, as long as they 
are not able to remedy the situation after.90 Brooks also criticises the fact that there is no 
mechanism in place that controls the situation and ensures that states act according to their 
responsibilities.91 Miller does admits this himself, and argues that if the theory commands 
widespread agreement, an institutional mechanism may be an additional outcome to the 
theory.92 Brooks’ criticism does therefore not undermine the purpose of Miller’s article. Given 
Kiribati’s situation, we have an obvious case where inaction inevitable would cause too much 
suffering, considering that the land will be uninhabitable. In this particular study I will therefore 
not address this issue much further. Other of Brook’s criticism may be looked at in relation to 
the results, in chapter 5.  
                                                          
85 Thom Brooks, “Cosmopolitanism and Distributing Responsibilities”, Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy, vol. 5, no. 3, 2002, pp. 92-97.  
86 Brooks, 2002, p. 92-93. 
87 Ibid, p. 93. 
88 Ibid, p. 94. 
89 Ibid, p. 95. 
90 Ibid, p. 96. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Miller, 2001, p. 454. 
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 “Rethinking remedial responsibilities” is another article written by Brooks, this time as a 
response to Millers book “National Responsibilities and Global Justice”.93 The critique is 
however still relevant when considering Millers original theory. Brooks raises one main 
problem in this article, namely that of the equality between the principles. He argues that 
capacity is always more important than the other principles, and should serve as a threshold for 
nations, before any other principles are considered.94 In other words, no nation should ever be 
assigned responsibility if it does not have the capacity to remedy the situation. This article by 
Brooks is not as critical as the first one, and could be seen as an expansion of Miller’s theory. I 
will take Brook’s criticism into consideration when discussing what the strongest connection is 
in the Kiribati case.  
 A similar idea is also expressed, but not fully explained, by Bradley. She is also of the 
opinion that the capacity principle should work as a sort of threshold criteria that helps narrow 
down the agents who are possibly remedially responsible.95 
 Like Brooks, Bradley also points out the lack of institutional instruments to guarantee that 
agents live up to their responsibilities.96 She also highlight the important and all too often 
forgotten problem of harm that migrants can be exposed to if they are forced to leave their 
homes, countries and former lifestyles. She argues that those who risk relocation should be 
presented with a wide range of choices of where to migrate to, so that the individual’s choice is 
promoted.97  
 
  
3.4  “Disappearing States”  
 
Finally, I would like to give a brief description of one major issue for small island states in 
relation to climate change - the possibility of "disappearance".  
 Several small island nations face the same threat from the rising sea-level; eventually the 
states might be "lost" underneath the sea, or in some other way become uninhabitable. This is 
not only a problem in matters of relocation, migration and land loss, but a threat to statehood 
                                                          
93 Thom Brooks, “Rethinking remedial responsibilities”, Ethics & Global Politics, vol. 4, no. 3, 2011, pp. 195- 
202. 
94 Ibid, pp. 199, 201. 
95 Ibid, pp. 149, 155. 
96 Ibid, p.156. 
97 Bradley, 2012, p. 156. 
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itself. This is very likely to have complications for whatever actions that are taken in regards to 
climate migration and relocation.   
 In an attempt to bring clarity to the issue, McAdam analyses the idea of statehood and 
proposes possible outcomes for islands at risk. In short, she reaches the conclusion that there is 
no simple 'legal solution' to the problem, and also that there are Human Rights implications to 
be considered (e.g. statelessness). She emphasises the importance of recognition by other states 
as a way to ensure at least some sort of state-functionality.98      
 Ödalen suggest a solution where states continue to exercise sovereign control over their 
abandoned territory and territorial waters, despite that the population lives elsewhere. This 
proposal should be considered, although it might not be ideal since it may have negative 
consequences in regards to people’s self-determination.99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
98 McAdam, 2012:a, pp. 119-160. 
99 Jörgen Ödalen, “Underwater Self-determination: Sea-level Rise and Deterritorialized Small Island States”, 
Ethics, Policy & Environment, vol.17, no. 2, 2014, pp. 225-237. 
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4  Kiribati’s Connections 
 
The fourth chapter examines possible ways to distribute responsibility for climate migrants 
from Kiribati. For each of Miller’s four principles I present various agents with connections to 
the situation facing these migrants, with the ultimate aim of identifying one agent, or a few, as 
remedially responsible. The result is presented below and will thereafter be further discussed 
in chapter five, Discussion, Conclusions and Theoretical Evaluation. 
  
 
4.1 The Causal Responsibility Principle 
 
The first principle to be attended will be that of causal responsibility, that is, a historical 
principle where I look at past actions to find out who caused the situation in the first place. 
Given that climate change is caused by the emissions of greenhouse gases, there are direct 
causal links between the actions of agents (greenhouse-gas emissions) and the negative 
situation (sea-level rise, and ultimately migration from Kiribati).100 
So, to begin with there is a clear causality between greenhouse gas emissions and climate 
migration from Kiribati. Unfortunately a causality alone is not enough. Problems arise in the 
next stage where we try to identify the particular agent who is causally responsible. Industries 
are the ones who emit the gases, and so the majority of all companies could be held responsible 
for their emissions. April 2014 the Climate Mitigation Services (CMS) released the report 
”Carbon Majors: Accounting for Carbon and Methane Emissions 1854 – 2010”101. The first of 
its kind to report such comprehensive research on greenhouse gas emissions expanding over a 
long historical period. It has examined both companies and countries. The three top investor-
owned companies are Chevron (USA), ExxonMobil (USA), and BP (UK).102 But is it fair to 
assign responsibilities to only some of the companies? Are the nations ‘hosting’ these 
companies also responsible? And what about other companies and individuals who indirectly 
benefit from the companies above, in one way or another? Because of these uncertainties, 
                                                          
100 Synthesis Report, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014, Assessment Report 5,  
     2014, s. 10. 
101 “Carbon Majors: Accounting for Carbon and Methane Emissions 1854 – 2010, Methods And Results  
      Report”, Richard Heede for Climate Mitigation Services, Snowmass, U.S.A, 7 April 2014. 
102 Ibid, p. 29, table 1. 
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companies cannot not be the agents that present the strongest connection. It seems too difficult 
to assign particular responsibilities to only a few agents.  
 Along the same lines, all industrialized nations could be held responsible for not 
regulating laws to restrict the emissions. Historically, the report from CMS presents China and 
the Former Soviet Union as the top emitters among nations.103 Similarly to the problems that 
arose when considering companies as remedially responsible, it is problematic to assign 
responsibility to nations on the grounds of historical emissions. We would have to answer to 
questions such as if one can assign responsibility to a nation for the acts of past generations and 
if a few nations alone can stand responsible for the emissions. Any conclusions drawn from this 
option will be easily questioned, and in addition have too many possible agents with remedial 
responsibilities.  
 Individuals do, of course also play a role. They contribute partly due to consumption, but 
one could also argue that since they have political power, they can influence political decisions. 
However, in this case it is impossible to consider individuals – there are way too many people 
who contribute to climate change in some way. Moreover, the emissions per person will not 
vary that much between the people in the top, and it would be unmanageable too even try to 
single out one (or a few).  
 The report I have used is so far one of a kind. Perhaps it would be a little hastily to use 
this as the only source on which we make our decisions? But so far, this one report is what helps 
us being a little more specific in our search, rather than holding all industrialized nations 
responsible.   
 We must remember that the goal is to find an agent with particular responsibility. Since 
all emissions have global effects, it is impossible to trace causality directly to one agent, be that 
a nation, a company, or an individual. Many different actions and choices will have led to the 
outcome of certain countries emitting more than others. Finding one agent to hold responsible 
here is next to, impossible, considering how countries interact and effect each other, and 
therefore are not the only agent liable for their own emissions. Miller argues that the causal 
principle cannot define remedial responsibilities in cases where no agent can be identified, or 
when too many agents are causally responsible.104 Ultimately, the causal responsibility 
principle has not presented us with a particularly strong connection between particular agents 
who contributes to climate change, and climate migration from Kiribati.  
                                                          
103 "Carbon Majors: Accounting for carbon and methane emissions 1854-2010 - Methods & Result Report",  
      2014. 
104 Miller, 2001, p. 457. 
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4.2 The Moral Responsibility Principle 
 
Closely linked to causal responsibility is that of moral responsibility. In contrast to causal 
responsibility, moral responsibility investigates whether the agents conduct is justifiable or not. 
According to Miller there are two options when agents are morally responsible. Firstly, if the 
agent acts wrongly; and the secondly, if an agent fails to act "as duty requires".105 
 Let us start with the first. Did the agents act immorally, as in ‘wrong’? Returning here to 
Miller’s initial questions: was the sea-level rise intentional, in order so that Kiribati would 
become uninhabitable? Did the agent foresee the consequences? Did the agent’s behaviour 
violate some “standard of reasonable care”? 106 
 To the first question the answer is unsurprisingly no. There is no evidence that 
industrialized countries, companies or individuals intended for Kiribati to become 
uninhabitable. 
 In regards to whether the consequences were foreseeable, one could argue that ever since 
science established that there is a link between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, 
we can apply the moral responsibility. Early on there might not have been any exact predictions 
of Kiribati’s situation, but because climate change causes sea-level rise, any sort of analysis 
would find that Kiribati is at risk. In addition, we could also argue that the emissions also 
violated the “standards of reasonable care”. Continuing these emissions when knowing that 
there might or will be harmful consequences cannot be considered careful. 
 But before going into a deeper analysis of different actors and their emissions from a 
certain point in the history of science, I can simply state that such an action will only provide 
me with similar results as those I got from the causality principle. The difference would be 
focus on present emissions rather than historical. It would not provide the particular 
agent/agents that I am looking for. 
 Instead I move on to Miller’s second option, which takes into account is if agents have 
acted as duty requires. As mentioned in chapter 3 Literature and Previous Research, climate 
migration is not covered by International Law. The types of duties that could be addressed 
instead are both national and international protocols, treaties, laws and regulations related to 
greenhouse-gas emissions and climate change. Going through all of these document to see 
where an agent has failed to live up to its commitments would be a huge task for a study like 
                                                          
105 Miller, 2001, p. 458. 
106 Based on the questions in Miller, 2001, p. 456. 
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mine. Apart from the large scope of documents to be analysed, it would also require the 
evaluation of the goals set by each document, and reliable statistics of how well each goal was 
reached. On top of that it would inevitably result in several candidates. Again it would be 
difficult to single out one or a few of them to have stronger connections than the others – there 
would be too many agents, and the large scope of documents would provide for too many 
interpretations. 
  In the end, it seems like the moral responsibility principle was no able to find a 
particularly strong connection between one or a few agents and the climate migrants from 
Kiribati.  
 
 
 4.3  The Principle of Capacity 
 
The aim of section 4.3 is to identify what agent is best placed to assist Kiribati in the relocation 
of its people. Taking the two steps of Kiribati's relocation strategy into consideration, two basic 
needs can easily be identified - namely the capacity to relocate (i.e. both financial support ant 
land to relocate to), and the need education and adaptation when relocated.  
 Beginning with the need of land and economic support, we once again have to consider 
very complex matters. On what grounds does one decide who has the capacity to do this? Could 
e.g. companies and individuals be considered? Could answers be found in analysing nations’ 
population densities, their size, their inhabitable land, or perhaps their economic situations? 
 I would argue that would be unrewarding to consider both individuals and companies. 
Neither of these agents have land to offer, and their economy in entwined with the economy 
nations. Therefore nations will be considered.   
 The nations topping the list of most densely populated countries is Greenland, Mongolia, 
Namibia, Australia and Iceland.107 According to the World Bank the countries with the largest 
                                                          
107 World Bank Data, Population Density (people per sq. km of land area), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST?order=wbapi_data_value_2013+wbapi_data_value+wba
pi_data_value-last&sort=asc (accessed 2015-01-02); To define developed countries I have used UN's 
following list:                                                                                                                                      
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#developed (accessed 2015-01-02) 
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economies are China and the United States,108 while Luxembourg and Norway are the first two 
candidates when it comes to GDP per capita.109  
 However, what does this say about these nations’ actual capacity for admitting a group of 
I-Kiribati? Does a densely populated country make for a country good at integration? Does it 
even mean that they have land that can or should be inhabited? Does a rich nation ensure that 
the I-Kiribati get the education they need?  
 Moreover, the statistics I presented above are only some statistics, and only from one 
source, the World Bank. There are several ways to decide which nation is the richest, and also 
which nation has the land most appropriate for the I-Kiribati to be relocated to. Greenland may 
be densely populated, but then the actual habitable land may not be enough.  
 Similarly to previous principles, a full investigation of capacity would present us with too 
many possible agents with responsibility. There would also be too much room for disagreement, 
due to the various ways in which the concept of ‘capacity’ could be interpreted. This is yet 
another principle which cannot identify a particular agent with particular responsibility. 
 
4.4 The Communitarian Principle 
 
I have now reached the last principle, that of community. The loose definitions which Miller 
presents,110 make it possible to look at many different types of communitarian bonds. I have 
limited myself to the community within the nation itself, including The Government of Kiribati, 
as well as community ties relating to geography, language and international relations between 
certain states. 
 To begin with, the Government of Kiribati could be seen as having a special responsibility 
towards the I-Kiribati simply by being their representative government. In the relocation 
strategy by the Government of Kiribati, it is already proposed that the I-Kiribati have special 
responsibilities towards each other, which is in agreement with the communitarian principle.  
 Furthermore, Kiribati has strong connections to other island nations, being part of the 
community of the Small Island Developing States Network.  
                                                          
108 World Bank Data, in order of GDP,                      
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries/all?order=wbapi_data_value_2013%20wb
  api_data_value%20wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc&display=default (accessed 2015-01-03) 
109 World Bank Data, GDP per capita, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries?or-
der=wbapi_data_value_2013%20wbapi_data_value%20wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc&display=default 
(accessed 2015-01-03) 
110 See Chapter 2, “The Connection Theory” 
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 Language wise the I-Kiribati also have special ties with other English-speaking nations, 
as English is one of Kiribati’s official language, along with the native 'I-Kiribati Language'.111  
 New Zealand and Australia are two close English-speaking neighbours. In addition, New 
Zealand has already established a type of community bond with Kiribati, in regards to the 
Pacific Access Visa (see 1.1 Kiribati and the Impacts of Climate Change). Because of the 
migration laws between New Zealand and Australia, one could argue that there is also a slight 
second community connection between Kiribati and Australia, on the basis of the connection 
with New Zealand. 112 
 The United States and the United Kingdom also has special community ties due to the 
shared language. The United Kingdom also because of their colonial past,113 and the United 
States has an arguable connection on the basis of geographical distance, which is remarkably 
farther than that between e.g. New Zealand and Australia.  
 So far the communitarian principle seems to best present us with particular agents. 
 
 
4.5  The Strongest Connection  
 
The time has come to decide which principle that presented us with the strongest connection. 
In other words, I will now make out who, according to Miller, should be assigned remedial 
responsibility towards the relocation of the I-Kiribati. 
 The causal and moral principles can both be disregarded on the basis of not being able to 
identify a particular agent with a particular responsibility. Examining them both presented 
with too large a number of possible candidates, and I questioned if these countries could be held 
causally responsible on their own, since it is hard to be precise when defining the actual 
causality.  
 It was stated that the capacity principle was too complex and open for various different 
interpretations of the concept of ‘capacity’. The U.S, China, Luxembourg and Norway were in 
the top from an economical point of view, while Australia, Greenland and Iceland were 
                                                          
111 “Practical Information”, Government of Kiribati, Official Tourist Website, Language, Culture 
<http://www.kiribatitourism.gov.ki/index.php/practicalinformation/languageculture accessed> 2015-01-12. 
112 “Factsheet 17 – New Zealanders in Australia”, Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Australian 
Government, Last modified: Friday 07 November 2014, available at <https://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-
sheets/17nz.htm> accessed 2015-01-11. 
113 See section 1.1 Kiribati and the Impacts of Climate Change. 
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mentioned as the most densely populated nations in the world.114 Ultimately, even if it was 
possible to narrow the principle down to some more specific actors, the result proved too 
questionable. A country ranking high in population density, or for instance GDP, does not with 
certainty imply that the agent has the best capacity to deal with the situation.  
 The communitarian principle provided the most specific connections. As representatives 
of the people, The Government of Kiribati have an obvious communitarian connection; the 
same applies to individual I-Kiribati towards each other (including the ones who have already 
moved abroad).  
 Other Small Island Developing States in the area have special communitarian bonds to 
Kiribati, partly because of the community they share, such as the SIDS Network. Many small 
island nations also have community ties to Kiribati in form of language and geography. Further 
connection were made between Kiribati and the UK, the US, New Zealand and Australia.  
 It seems like the communitarian principle provided the most specific connections. But 
once again, the goal is to find a particular agent. Assigning responsibilities to all of the agents 
that came out as the result from this principle does not seem specific enough.  
 Even if we take Miller's ideas of immediate (short term) and final (long term) 
responsibility into account, the problem still remains. One could argue that the Government of 
Kiribati has long term responsibility for their population, being their official representatives, 
and that other agents has immediate responsibility for the relocation and to make sure the I-
Kiribati get back on their feet. However, since the future of Kiribati as a state is unsure, it is yet 
impossible to make a distinction between immediate and final responsibility.  
 Narrowing down the extent of possible candidates purely by the usage of Miller’s theory 
seems difficult, and I would therefore like to bring attention to the purpose of Miller’s theory. 
In his own words: "[the] overriding interest is to identify an agent who can remedy the 
deprivation or suffering that concerns us".115 Bearing in mind especially that Miller wants to 
find an agent who ”can”, in other words, who is able to, remedy the situation, I would like to 
introduce the threshold proposal made by Brooks.116 As mentioned, Brooks suggested that 
‘capacity’ should be seen as more important than the other three principles – the agents who 
are remedially responsible must have the capacity to remedy the situation.  
                                                          
114 See section 4.3 The Principle of Capacity. 
115 Miller, 2001, p. 471. 
116 See section 3.3 The Connection Theory.  
 27 
 
 Since my candidates almost exclusively ended up being nations, I will use United Nations 
classification of developed and non-developed countries to make the division easier.117 Least 
developed countries as well as developing countries will be seen as more unfit to be remedially 
responsible than developed countries. This distinction rules out Small Island Developing States, 
and also Kiribati, being one of the so called “least developed countries”, according to the UN. 
 The agents left now are the UK, the US, New Zealand and Australia. Basing this purely 
on the communitarian principle, the connection between Kiribati and the US is noticeably 
weaker, since both New Zealand and Australia are closer geographically, plus they already have 
an exchange. I argue that remedial responsibility should therefore be distributed between the 
UK, New Zealand and Australia. According to the Connection Theory, it is not a problem to 
divide responsibility between different agents according to relative strength of connection. 
Also, the distribution may depend on what will remedy the situation in the best way, which 
might mean that several agents work together.118 Here other connections could work as 
guidelines. Australia and New Zealand could, for example, have a greater responsibility to 
admit migrants than the UK, considering the fact that the first two hosts 3 respectively 17 people 
per km2, while the UK has 265.119 Exactly what action that should be taken by each country is 
something which should be agreed among the involved parties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
117 <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#developed> (accessed 2015-01-02) 
118 Miller, 2001, p. 469. 
119 World Bank Data, Population Density, 2013. 
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5  Discussion, Conclusions and Theoretical 
Evaluation  
 
This chapter begins by discussing the strongest connections that were identified previously. The 
discussion puts these findings and possible solutions in relation to other existing research within 
the field (as presented in chapter 3). The discussion on my conclusions and ideas about possible 
ways forward is followed by an evaluation of, and a response to, Miller’s connection theory 
and previous criticism of it. 
 
5.1  Discussion and Conclusions  
 
Perhaps not unexpectedly, neither the moral, causal or capacity principle were on their own 
successful in identifying a particular agent with remedial responsibility. Investigating the 
communitarian principle, I concluded that this was the principle that presented the most specific 
connections. The three agents to whom the essay assigned remedial responsibility were the UK, 
New Zealand and Australia. These links might not have been the most obvious ones, and many 
writers have previously argued for responsibility distribution based on the causal and moral 
links should be the ones on which to make a decision. My essay does, however, oppose this 
idea by proposing that more attention is paid to the ultimate goal of Miller’s theory – namely 
to identify particular agents. On this basis, causality, moral and capacity present too many 
connections with similar strengths. They are also open for various interpretations, resulting only 
in vague and diffuse conclusions. The theory states that it is not so much a question of who is 
appointed remedially responsible, but that someone is held responsible. This approach intends 
to yield more action than would be the case if too many agents were held responsible. For these 
reasons I argue that the communitarian principle presents the strongest connections between 
Kiribati and particular agents.  
 As a response to McAdam's critique of treaties as "the answer", a four-party agreement 
between Kiribati, the UK, New Zealand and Australia might be preferred and yield the best 
results. In order for agreements to be as effective and accurate as possible, these types of options 
should be considered more often when investigating climate migration is investigated - issues 
that are never easily tackled.  
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 Generally, to say that certain agents are responsible to remedy a situation, does not 
suggest that the people who are to be remedied should not be involved in the decision making. 
I agree with Bradley120, that individual wishes should be of high priority. Assigning 
responsibilities to other nations simply mean that other nations have better economical and 
territorial capacity, not that their wishes are superior.  
  Assigning responsibility to the Government of Kiribati, does not in any way imply that 
they are not responsible for their people. As a Government they have other (often formally 
assigned) responsibilities. That said, they should not have to bear the costs of this particular 
situation which has occurred as a result of climate change.  
 It is important to bear in mind the plausible problems of statehood and statelessness. In 
the end, the type of action that is needed to remedy the situation does completely rely on the 
future of Kiribati as a state. The idea of Kiribati as a “disappearing state”, will inevitably present 
the agents with a full responsibility for the future lives of the relocated I-Kiribati. However, if 
Kiribati continues to function as a state even without its territory, the action that is required 
from the agents will be concentrated to the actual relocation and adaption of the I-Kiribati. As 
mentioned before, immediate and final responsibility cannot be established until the issue of 
statehood is solved. Research and discussions on the possibilities for Kiribati to remain a 
sovereign state is therefore essential.  Along the same lines, issues regarding aspects such as 
cultural losses and the loss of language need to be addressed further.   
  A limitation of the study I have conducted is that it was carried out on the presumption 
of climate change as the only trigger for migration. Had I taken other triggers into account, such 
as socio-economical ones, the outcome might have been the more complex. As an example, 
historical factors that have affected Kiribati's economic situation would have been interesting 
to examine as a part of the causal principle, e.g. the UK’s role as a former coloniser, in relation 
to theories of world poverty, or the current global economic system.  Considering my argument 
that particular agents are harder to identify within the causal and moral principles, it is uncertain 
whether this type of investigation would have provided any connections of the same strength 
as those I have already identified. 
 In contrast to previous research, I have focused on a single approach to a particular case 
rather than searching for one approach that is capable of dealing with all types of climate 
migration. While I personally find Risse's and Ödalen's more controversial ideas regarding 
democratic functioning, the right to relocation as well as common ownership of the earth utterly 
                                                          
120 See section 3.3 The Connection Theory 
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interesting, I believe my approach could have the advantage of being relatively non-
controversial, and it not requiring any large-scale institutional changes before it could be put to 
practice.121 We are in need of a general, international, acceptance of the conclusions that are 
drawn. I do not claim that distributing responsibility on the grounds of Miller’s theory would 
be easily accomplished, but it is nevertheless something worth considering.  
 When it comes to moving from theory to practice, that is to make the agents feel 
responsible and to act accordingly, a joint effort from the scientific community, non-
governmental organisations and media could be a rewarding strategy, rather than focusing on 
the cooperation and treaties in the international community. Pressure from these types of non-
governmental actors might be an option that could avoid pressure and conflicts between states. 
For a sustainable and long-term distribution, international agreements could nevertheless be 
useful.  
 This particular case study confirms the complexity of Kiribati's situation, but also that of 
climate migrants generally. The result from my investigation could contribute to future studies, 
by highlighting possible challenges for cases where climate change is a main trigger for 
migration. If the aim is to identify particular agents, studies of similar cases will also have 
difficulties when examining actors on the basis of moral and causal principles. Problems with 
these historical approaches is also in agreement with both Bell and Risse's work.122 If “capacity” 
is of interest, it is likely that they will face similar problems to mine, when it comes to 
identifying the concept of capacity. Having reached the conclusion that nations are remedially 
responsible, I believe that a similar study that focuses on only national responsibility would be 
rewarding. This essay has nevertheless highlighted some issues in assigning responsibility on 
the basis of four of Miller’s principles, both specifically in the case of Kiribati, but also criticism 
of the generality of the principles. 
What remains a major issue in the field of climate migration is still the confusion of 
definitions. Kiribati and other small island states, where climate change induced sea-level-rise 
functions as the major trigger, and where the population of a whole nation needs to be relocated, 
classifications may not be very troublesome. Categorising migrants might be trickier in cases 
where people escape drought or storms as individuals rather than groups or populations. A study 
that covers a large spectra of climate change and migration, with the intention of clarifying 
                                                          
121 See chapter 3.2 International Law and Responsibility for a brief presentation of their ideas; coming studies 
that build upon Risse's and Ödalen's work would nevertheless be very interesting, and could perhaps have 
more of a long-term impact in the field of migration as a whole. 
122 See Chapter 3 “Existing Research on Climate Migration and Responsibility.   
 31 
 
these definitions would be welcomed. Bates’ classification might not have gained widespread 
acceptance, but could still work as a basis for a more comprehensive study that takes existing 
laws and regulations into account.123 
 
 
5.2  Theoretical Evaluation  
 
The Connection Theory succeeded in identifying some agents as ‘more responsible’ than others 
when examining climate migration from Kiribati. I must admit that my initial expectation was 
that either the causal responsibility principle or the moral responsibility principle would present 
the strongest connection. If they had not my next guess would have been the capacity principle. 
These three principle are common bases for distributing responsibility. To start with I did 
therefore not have high expectations when I considered the communitarian principle. 
Nevertheless, this was the principle that did not break when I realised the complications and 
complexities of responsibility based on historical events, as well as the trouble in identifying 
an agent in particular.  
 Miller argues that “although the connection theory is internally complex, this complexity 
may simply mirror the complexity of real-world cases in which remedial responsibility has to 
be assigned".124 In other words, the various interpretations of the principles, as well as the moral 
decision of which is the strongest connection might make up just what we need in order to 
analyse the challenging cases we will inevitably meet in this world. 
 Despite this all-including nature of the theory, this I also a limitation of Miller’s 
theoretical approach. One could argue that the theory’s complexity is actually limiting.  
 Let us consider the case of Kiribati. While the historical principles did provide a wide 
range of possible agents, that was also the factor that brought them both down. If a more 
comprehensive examination of possible moral and causal agents had been carried out, it might 
have been possible to identify one of them as having a stronger connection than the others. 
However, due to the extensive number of agents to be considered, it is very likely that for every 
case there would be too many possible answers, and that leaving the decision up to “shared 
moral intuition” would come close to leaving it to chance.  
                                                          
123 For a brief presentation of Bates see section 3.1 Climate Change and Migration. 
124 Miller, 2001, p. 471. 
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 Capacity is another wide definition which also lead to a wide range of possible agents. 
What type of capacity are we looking for? There are so many ways of measuring capacity that 
it is not possible to draw any clear conclusions. Thus, because of the complexity of the 
principles, the theory presents too many possible ways of identifying agents, and is therefore 
also limiting. Furthermore, this complicates the distribution of responsibility, in the sense that 
“shared moral institutions” might not agree with the principle in which we were able to identify 
a particular agent. We might for example have to abandon the very principle that takes morality 
into account.  
  To fully support an argument of who is responsible for remedying a situation, it is 
essential to be able to explain the reasons behind our decision. In order for reasons and 
arguments to have the desired effect, we need to be able to scrutinize them on all possible levels, 
or they may be exposed to criticism that they cannot withstand and so lose their authority. If 
there are too many options available, all with their own complex connections to the situation, 
and if the conclusions are based on “shared moral values” even though the moral principle 
might not even apply, it seems as though the comprehensiveness of the theory could be its 
weakness. The large scope of candidates that can be considered, do nevertheless highlight the 
complexity of the cases that are investigated. Thus the theory at least offers great insight when 
examining the possibilities for the distribution of responsibility.   
 Moreover, returning to the very basis of Miller’s theory, one could also criticise him for 
assuming that remedial responsibility has to be assigned without providing any basis for such 
an idealistic statement. It could be expected that to find no 'has to' but rather a 'should be'. I 
will, however, not go any further into these moral and ideological questions, since Miller does 
not present his theory as a fixed and perfected model for responsibility distribution, but as a 
"way of thinking" in order to highlight the complexity of a case.125 
  In my case, the strongest connection was presented when the communitarian principle 
was investigated. The strongest connection was based on language, geographical location and 
already existing communitarian bonds. It may seem a bit extreme to argue that because New 
Zealand speak the same language, are closely situated and to some extent already have an 
exchange, they are responsible for the entire population of Kiribati. Especially the connection 
based on existing relations between nations could have a negative impact on the willingness of 
already developed countries to initiate bilateral or other types of agreements with countries 
where large groups are (or are at risk of) suffering. To aim at always finding somebody 
                                                          
125 Ibid. 
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responsible, on the basis of connections such as language, culture, geography and so on, may 
also cause insecurities internationally - an issue further addressed by Brooks.126 However, I 
previously suggested that actors who are not tied specifically to nations, such as NGOs, media 
and the scientific community, could play a key role in assigning responsibility and to put 
pressure on agents to act. This might have a somewhat lesser impact on the political climate.  
 Furthermore by identifying only particular agents, with particular responsibility, there is 
a risk that other agents whom are somewhat still responsible, be that causally or morally, are 
left out of the picture. That could possibly work as an incentive for these agents not to contribute 
in solving the issue, even though they too have capacity, or perhaps are liable to moral or causal 
blame.   
 What I also identified as a major problem with Miller’s theory is his claim that all 
principles are equal. Just like Brooks explicitly argues, and like Bradley implicitly suggests, 
capacity should be the basic principle and work as a threshold. If an agent is unable to contribute 
to the remedy, somebody else should be assign remedial responsibility. Otherwise the purpose 
of the theory – to remedy a situation – is lost. 
 In certain cases, where it is well known that there are several agents with different 
connections, other principles could also work as thresholds rather than aim at individually 
present identify particular agents. Take climate migration as an example. By having causal 
and/or moral responsibility as a criteria, rather than looking only at the individual principles, it 
would be easier to narrow down the number of possible candidates and, that way, make it easier 
to identify particular agents. For instance, most industrialized countries are causally and 
morally responsible. Most of them could probably be seen as having “the capacity” to also 
remedy the situation to some extent. To create a model for investigations regarding climate 
migration, we could have certain criteria for causal and moral responsibility, as well as a 
threshold for capacity. This way the determining principle would be community, a principle 
that has gained little attention so far when examining responsibility for climate migrants. This 
would make the theory a little narrower, and that way a little more useful. 
 Finally, I feel the need to address the extended version of the theory that Miller presents 
in his book “National Responsibilities and Global Justice”. The investigation I carried out ended 
up focusing almost exclusively around nation states. The difficulties involved in investigating 
the responsibilities of organisations, institutions, individuals and companies unfortunately 
proved to beyond the scope of this essay. With this in mind, perhaps the extended version of 
                                                          
126 See section 3.3 The Connection Theory. 
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Miller’s Connection Theory could bring other dimensions to a similar study. Still, proposals 
such as that of “thresholds” and the development of more specific models, as well as criticism 
of individual principles, can still apply to the extended version of the theory.  
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